Constitution Proposal #813
17. ENFORCEMENT AND INTERPRETATION OF THE CONSTITUTION
Enforcement Of The Constitution
Co-Sponsoring EDA’s
Brossard–Saint-Lambert,Vaudreuil,Davenport,Eglinton–Lawrence,Hastings–Lennox and Addington–Tyendinaga,Niagara South,Ottawa Centre,Perth–Wellington,Scarborough–Guildwood–Rouge Park,Thunder Bay–Rainy River,Wellington–Halton Hills North,Windsor West,Provencher,Foothills,Abbotsford–South Langley,Cloverdale–Langley City,Prince George–Peace River–Northern Rockies,Saanich–Gulf Islands,Skeena–Bulkley Valley,Vernon–Lake Country–Monashee
Short Summary of Proposal
While Article 17 of the Conservative Party Constitution is titled “Enforcement … of the Constitution,” its body contains no actual enforcement rules or procedures for addressing breaches. Article 19 covers only narrow local EDA-level disputes, leaving a major gap for violations by any party body or official.
The proposed new clauses 17.4 and 17.5 address this deficit by: (1) establishing a straightforward process for members to report constitutional breaches and ensure prompt remedies, and (2) authorizing appropriate sanctions against those responsible. Adding these clauses would promote greater adherence to the Constitution, benefiting all party members.
Frequently Asked Questions
Why do we need this addition? The Constitution already talks about dispute resolution in Article 19!
Article 19 describes (in the wrong place) a top-down process, managed by National Council and by a committee that it appoints, that is designed to deal only with only ONE limited case of dispute. What we really need in Article 17 (in the correct place) is a comprehensive Constitution-enforcement process that applies to ALL alleged breaches of the Constitution and is managed by an independent Oversight Committee that can hold even National Council accountable.
Isn’t this proposal too long?
No! Once we expand Article 17, it will still be way shorter than many other Articles in the Constitution – even though it deals with a really important topic that’s fundamentally important to the democratic health of the Party. Remember: our proposal is not seeking merely to adjust pre-existing rules about enforcing the Constitution. Instead, it’s seeking to create rules where (astonishingly) they do not yet exist. Considered in this light, our proposal is certainly not too long.
Shouldn’t we avoid inserting prescriptive rules into a document designed only to articulate high-level principles?
There are already many prescriptive rules in the Constitution, especially when it comes to process – look at Article 10, for example. Among these we already find rules describing the process for dealing with an EDA that has allegedly breached the Constitution (Article 19). All we’re proposing in #813 is a more comprehensive process that covers a much wider range of instances in which the problem of Constitution-breaking might arise.
Isn’t this proposal trying to fix a problem that doesn’t exist? The people higher up the Party hierarchy are good people already heavily invested in upholding the Constitution.
Well, we are quite sure that the people in EDAs across the country are also generally good people -– but that doesn’t mean that the Constitution is silent on how to deal with EDAs that are misbehaving. It should not be silent, either, on a process for dealing with alleged Constitutional breaches everywhere else in the Party, from the bottom to the top. It’s common sense – since it’s not only EDAs that can adopt a casual approach to observing the Constitution.
